Table 2

Summary of study characteristics and head-to-head comparisons testing behavioural economics decision biases.

Author (year)Country nEffectStudy lengthPA measureIncentive sizeBehavioural economics
concepts
Head-to-head comparisons (relevant behavioural economics decision biases)
Acland (2015)44 USA120+/−12,24Gym1.00–3.57PB, SAL, COM, FSNone
Adams (2017)15 USA96+/NA16,0Fitbit Zip1.00PB, SAL
  • Immediate outperformed delayed incentives (PB)

  • Adaptive goals outperformed static goals (SAL)

Andrade (2014)45 USA61±15,24Pedometer0.91–7.00PB, LA, OO, EENone
Babcock (2015)46 USA365+/NA2,0Gym2.50PB, SAL, HB
  • Team incentives produced larger increases in gym visits than individual-level ones (HB)

Carrera (2018)47 USA690−/−6,8Gym0.71–1.42PB, LA, EE
  • Pre-selected item-based incentives outperformed cash incentives (LA)

  • $60 for nine gym visits no more effective than $30 (SAL)

Condliffe (2017)48 USA181+/+3,2Gym0.29PB, SAL, HB, EE, FS
  • Team incentives produced larger increases in gym visits than individual-level ones (HB)

  • Information on peers’ gym attendance promoted more frequent gym use (HB)

Finkelstein (2016)Singapore800+/−24,24Fitbit Zip3.19PB, LA, COMNone
Finkelstein (2017)49 Singapore161+/NA16,0Pedometer1.48PB, LA, OO, COM
  • Incentives received by participants themselves increased physical activity, but incentives in the form of charitable donations did not (HB)

Harkins (2017)USA94+/−16,4Fitbit Alta2.86PB, LA
  • Charitable donations were effective for older participants (HB)

Kullgren (2014)USA92−/−16,8Pedometer3.00PB, LA, OO, HB
  • Participants with access to an online peer network walked no more than participants without access (HB)

Leahey (2015)USA268+/NA12,36Self-monitor0.53PB, SALNone
Losina (2018)53 USA202+/NA24,0Fitbit Zip1.82PB, LANone
Patel (2016a)USA281+/−13,13Smartphone1.40PB, LA, OO, SAL
  • Loss-framed incentives outperformed lottery and gain-framed incentives (LA, OO, PB)

Patel (2016b)USA304+/−13,13Smartphone1.25PB, OO, SAL, HB
  • Incentives for individual- combined with team-based goals outperformed either approach alone (HB)

Patel (2016c)USA286+/−13,13Smartphone1.40PB, LA, OO, SAL, HB
  • Incentives for performance compared with group median outperformed comparison to 75th percentile (HB))

Patel (2018)57 USA209+/−13,13Smartphone1.25–1.40PB, OO, SAL
  • Daily small lottery incentives combined with jackpot lotteries outperformed either condition alone (PB, SAL, OO)

Petry (2013)58 USA45+/+12,24Pedometer5.57PB, LA, OONone
Pope (2014)USA117+/−12,20Gym4.67PB, LA, SALNone
Rohde (2016)The Netherlands415+/+26,26Gym0.09–0.15PB, SAL, FS
  • Participants receiving quarterly feedback on the exact number of weeks they met their gym visit goal attended the gym more often than participants who did not (SAL)

Royer (2015)61 USA1000+/+12,36Gym4.80PB, LA, SAL, COM, FSNone
Shin (2017)South Korea105+/NA12,0Fitmeter1.24PB, LANone
van der Swaluw (2018)The Netherlands163+/−13/26, 13/0Gym0.89PB, LA, OONone
Washington (2016)64 USA19NA/NA3,1Fitbit One2.38PB, LA, SAL, EE
  • No difference between $25 deposit contract (participant money is ‘on the line’) and no-deposit group (LA)

  • COM, commitment; EE, endowment effect; Effect, evidence of positive (+) or no (−) effect when incentives in place/after incentives withdrawn; FS, fresh start; Fitmeter, combined accelerometer + app;Gym, number of gym visits; HB, herd behaviour; LA, loss aversion;NA, not applicable due to no post-intervention follow-up period; OO, over-optimism;PA, physical activity; PB, present bias; SAL, salience; Self-monitor, self-monitoring of physical activity behaviour; Smartphone, built-in smartphone accelerometer + app;incentive size, incentive magnitude (per person per day in USD); n, sample size;study length, duration in weeks of intervention.